In recent days, a judge at the Milan Tribunal has handed down a ruling that gives you chills just thinking about it, even before writing it down. To truly understand what is going on - especially for an Italian who knows the person involved - you have to avoid fixating on the character and assume, rigorously, that the decision was issued against an ordinary person. The crux, in fact, is not Fabrizio Corona, but the judge’s reasoning.
Clear the ground of the (cumbersome) subject
Also because - let’s say it straight away - it is obvious that what Corona does is defamatory, though not so much because of the content (which it will be for the courts to verify as true or false), but because of everything swirling around it: comments, offences, insults, and so on. In short: it is one thing to state that Corona insults people, uses terms that are not compatible with journalism and not even functional to an investigation; it is quite another to argue that Corona, because he is not registered with the Italian Order of Journalists, has no right to carry out investigations, reporting, and so on.
Besides the fact that in the Italian criminal law system there is no such idea as preventive censorship: at most, action is taken against what has already been published, not against what might, perhaps, be published. It is mad, moreover, that a civil judge - not a criminal judge, but a civil one - should order the delivery of all materials, including digital ones (mobile phones, computers, as well as hard drives). A mad and senseless request: not only because it is incoherent, but also because it is ineffective in the age of the internet. And yet Italy reveals itself once again for what it is: a beautiful country, but in the hands of people who have destroyed and ruined it. Now, however, given that in the Italian landscape many comments have arrived from people such as Selvaggia Lucarelli or Salvo Sottile - comments which, in reality, lack objectivity because they are fuelled by an evident hostility towards the person involved (and perhaps they are even right, considering he insulted them; but the fact remains that one thing is private life and another is the activity of information, which should be objective) - we want to focus on the judge’s words, because they clearly return the reason why, in Italy, the most powerful caste is that of journalists, better described as “giornalai” (rag hack). That is, those individuals who have nothing professional about them, yet enjoy protection and influence in certain circles. People more eager to sell than to verify the news, more inclined to chase the echo of the moment than to care about the accuracy of their writing. It is a choice: there are those who safeguard professionalism and those who kneel to the click.
Italy is one of the few countries in which there exists an Order that, to be registered with it, you must pay, do unpaid internships, write pieces for several years without being paid in a newsroom that takes you in if you are politically aligned: because the law says they must pay you and you must also provide proof of payments to the Order, but in reality the newsrooms pay you and then ask you to give the money back in untraceable ways because “they can’t afford to pay you”, they say. Or you get in through journalism schools, obviously very expensive. In short: a caste that feeds itself. And then registration with this Order is, as is obvious, conditional on paying fees that allow the Order to live comfortably.
Protection for registered journalists is equal to zero. Reports against those characters who claim to be registered but are not, or against the registered journalists themselves who engage in conduct in blatant violation of the code of ethics, regularly end up as nothing whenever the reported person is a “friend of the president”.
And those journalists whom the Order considers inconvenient - that Order led nationally by Carlo Bartoli, who recently targeted a journalist guilty of nothing more than asking a question, data in hand, to the Prime Minister at a press conference - are struck with measures devoid of sense. We have seen some cases at regional level: Piero Armenti is one of them. But even Selvaggia Lucarelli herself, who today remains silent in the face of Carlo Bartoli’s statements and also in the face of the Milan judge’s order because she hates Corona, forgets that the very same arguments could be used against her. Because Lucarelli deregistered from the Order - a choice which, personally, I consider wise - and I have no respect for anyone who registers with the Italian Order of Journalists, one of the greatest cancers of the country: she deregistered precisely because they were bringing pretextual proceedings against her, aimed solely at creating problems for her. In light of what Bartoli and the Milan judge write, she too would not be able to do anything in her newsletter.
Let’s read together what Bartoli writes: «The ruling that the Milan Civil Tribunal has issued in the case of Fabrizio Corona confirms that there is no right to defame and that even influencers and prominent figures on the web must respect the law. It is also reassuring that the major platforms that profit by exploiting online hatred and discredit can finally be called to answer for defamation. It is a discordant note to invoke the right to report as claimed by Fabrizio Corona, since he is not a journalist and Falsissimo is not a registered publication. It is not censorship, therefore, but a ruling whose object is a purely commercial activity that has nothing to do with information. It is worth recalling that the right to report which journalists can rely on is not in any case an absolute right, but is subject to the conditions indicated by a historic ruling of the Court of Cassation which requires those who provide information to use respectful language and to observe putative truth, and only when dealing with matters of public interest. We ask Parliament to adopt stricter rules to punish those who disguise themselves as journalists while carrying out activities that have nothing to do with information, which is a primary good protected by the Constitution».
So, essentially, in the country that has been sliding for years in the freedom of the press rankings, the leaders of a caste claim that there is no right to report for those who are not registered with the Order of Journalists and, above all, for those who do not operate within a reality registered in court as a “registered publication”. Indeed, they even call for even more restrictive laws in order to feed their own power. Italy is a country that produces castes; and these castes are so obtuse that they feed themselves, flaunting their caste status, and woe betide anyone who touches them. No different from what happens in the judiciary, where magistrates - another caste - stamp their feet because they do not want to lose privileges. You only have to leave Italy to see that, in most countries where freedom is truly guaranteed, there are neither Orders of Journalists nor registered publications. Professional activity is supported by a code of ethics that anyone who intends to provide information must truly respect, not as in Italy, where the Order protects those it believes it must cover. Newspapers, then, are registered as information sites and in some countries they must be entered in Press Registers (especially print ones); but that registration is not conditional on payments or allegiances. In other countries, even freer, there is no need for any registration at all. And the level of the press is far higher than the Italian one, which has a terrible reputation internationally.
In short, let’s not kid ourselves: when I am at meetings of journalists in London or in Washington and I present my journalist’s card, I enjoy credibility and respect; when some Italian colleague presents it, they look at it and laugh in his face. Why? Because Italian journalism has no credibility. Abroad, the system is known and esteem is already lacking for that reason; then the results are observed. Italy has one of the worst press laws, and cases of defamation are extremely high. And, as a rule, the defamers (card and all) remain unpunished: I wonder why. In countries where press law better protects rights, the press does not write “hearsay”, does not defame, and cases that end up in court or in arbitrations are far rarer. How come?
Let’s analyse the order (in the light of serious laws)
«The respondent is not registered with the professional register of journalists… such facts… appear sufficient to soundly exclude that those same contents enjoy the guarantees placed by the Constitution to safeguard the press». And again: to invoke the protection “of the press” he should have shown that he is «characterised by a publication… with an editor-in-chief… a registered publisher… aimed at the professional activity of information… by professionally qualified subjects». These are passages from the order of the Milan Tribunal (interim proceedings under Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure) which, beyond Corona, raise a systemic issue: the idea that access to the guarantees of freedom of information depends on organisational form (registered publication) or on status (registration with the Order).
Here the point is not to “defend Corona”. The point is to verify whether a judge can, by interpretative means, construct a perimeter within which the freedom to inform and its related protections are triggered only under certain “corporate” or “registration” conditions. From the perspective of the ECHR (Article 10 ECHR), that reasoning is legally fragile: the freedom of expression and to receive/disseminate information is recognised to “everyone”, not to an authorised category. The Strasbourg Court assesses the function performed (informing the public, contributing to debate of general interest) and the proportionality of restrictions, not the possession of a card or the formal label of “publication”. If a state could condition the protections of information on registrations and memberships, the effect would be a gatekeeping power incompatible with the conventional standard: the restriction must be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim (for example, protection of reputation) and be “necessary in a democratic society”, therefore proportionate and with adequate safeguards.
There is also a technical misunderstanding to clear up, because it is often confused: the “guarantees of the press” in the strict sense (Article 21 of the Constitution and the rules on seizure of the press) and the broader freedom of thought/information. Italian case law has discussed for years when an online editorial product can be treated, for certain consequences, as “press” and when not. But from there to turning the absence of a registered publication or registration with the Order into an argument that downgrades the protection of freedom of information is a logical leap that exposes the order to conventional criticism: Article 10 ECHR also protects non-institutionalised forms of information (blogs, newsletters, digital channels), precisely because public debate no longer passes only through traditional newsrooms.
The second profile, even more problematic, is the “material” measure imposed by the civil judge: the order to deposit «by the second day… all physical media in his possession that contain the documents, images and videos… as well as… all materials capable of harming… the right… to reputation, image and privacy».
A civil measure that imposes the indiscriminate delivery of media and devices (phones, computers, hard drives, archives) resembles, in effect, a generalised search/seizure. In criminal proceedings, measures of this kind live within a fenced-off set of safeguards (typicality, stringent reasoning, relevance, oversight, chain of custody, protection of third parties and limits on acquiring extraneous data). In civil proceedings there are tools such as an order for production or the targeted acquisition of documents, but the logic is one of definiteness and “non-exploration”: you do not hand over “everything” to see what is inside. When the order becomes all-encompassing (“all materials capable of causing harm”), the risk is twofold: a disproportionate compression of the respondent’s rights and an infringement of third parties’ rights (correspondence, personal data, irrelevant contents), with a chilling effect (“chilling effect”) on any informational activity and source-gathering.
Read through the lens of the ECHR, such an invasive measure engages both Article 10 (freedom of information) and Article 8 (private life and correspondence). The Court is particularly severe when the State, even indirectly, obtains access to archives and communications in a broad and non-selective way: necessity and proportionality must be demonstrated, and the measure must be tailored to the aim (clear perimeter, criteria of relevance, minimisation, protection of extraneous data, guarantees of secrecy and independent oversight). A “mass” order, imposed in civil proceedings and within extremely tight deadlines, is exposed to challenge for excess and indeterminacy. One fact remains: defamation and the violation of reputation/privacy are legitimate interests that can be protected, and the legal system does have urgent instruments also with a preventive function. The dividing line lies in the measure. The removal of specifically identified content, a prohibition limited to certain known materials, the adoption of targeted technical safeguards have a logic of protection. A broad ban on “any further content” and, above all, the claim to acquire or immobilise “all media” shifts the axis towards preventive and invasive control which, in a democracy, requires thresholds of safeguards far higher than those invoked in the order.
A country without a future
After all, Italy is a country of mafia and castes. And you only have to look at it without hypocrisy: it is also the country where you find more bureaucracy than anywhere else, yet it remains the one in which corruption is structural, endemic, almost “normal”. The paradox is always the same: they repeat that bureaucracy serves to “prevent” corruption, and instead it often ends up becoming its fuel. Where procedures are more streamlined, where rules are clearer and traceable, the level of corruption tends to be lower. In Italy, by contrast, the machinery jams and someone profits: the labyrinth is not an accident, it is a model.
Take Uber: it had no small trouble setting foot in Italy and still today it clashes with the taxi drivers’ caste, notoriously one of the most aggressive in defending its privileges and, let’s say it, with an established reputation for serial tax evasion. The battle is not only about the service; it is about control. Uber, for those who travel, is a form of normality: clarity, speed, ease of use, traceability, readable rules. I travel often and abroad it is a lifeline when you need to move quickly. But here the answer is always the same, like a corporate catechism: «Well no, you can’t». You can’t because you don’t have the “taxi driver’s card”. You can’t because you’re not inside the “taxi drivers’ register”, you’re not inside the order, you’re not inside the category. In short: you can’t because you do not belong to the small caste.
And this is where the absurd becomes a system. That licence costs an absurd amount of money: it is not only a qualifying title, it is an economic barrier that turns a public service into private rent. And so Italy remains the country of castes, where access does not depend on merit or on the quality of the service, but on having paid the toll, on having entered the right enclosure, on possessing the right stamp. The most serious thing, however, is the reversal of the function of institutions. In many countries the judiciary has, over the years, served to dismantle corrupt systems, to strike at rents, to break obsolete systems. In Italy, too often, the problem is that the opposite happens: the judiciary is part of the same ecosystem, as corrupt as the political and social system, if not worse. And when castes protect one another, bureaucracy becomes the weapon, not the cure: it does not reduce corruption, it organises it.
M.P.
Silere non possum