Some truths cannot be left unspoken. The sources who entrust them to us remain protected.
Independent journalism can only exist where those who inform are free to do so without exposing their sources to consequences or reprisals.
At every stage of our work, from our digital infrastructure to the newsroom's inbox and the tools our contributors use, we apply the highest standards of protection available today. Information capable of identifying a source is never handed over to any authority.
Protecting a source is not a technical detail. It is the condition of our work.
It is an essential safeguard for investigative reporting, for the right to report and for freedom of information. That is why we protect those who write to us with the same care we devote to the news itself.
Published from Estonia, one of the freest countries in the world for the press.
Silere non possum is published by Clarionfold Press OÜ, a company incorporated under Estonian law. The publication has its registered office and its editorial and operational base in Estonia: a location that provides a clearly defined legal framework and strengthens the independence of our journalism.
Behind only Norway and the Netherlands, ahead of Denmark, Sweden and Finland.
Freedom of expression is protected at constitutional level; attacks on journalists are rare.
Political and judicial power does not systematically target the press.
A dedicated server, under our sole responsibility.
We do not live on shared hosting or lean on third-party platforms. The paper is hosted on a dedicated, independent server: a choice made partly out of necessity, after attempts by Vatican bodies and connected parties to interfere with press freedom and editorial independence.
No cohabitation
The environment is not shared with other sites or users, which removes one of the most common attack routes: exploiting the vulnerability of a 'neighbour' on the same machine.
Direct control
Updates, system hardening, encryption, security configuration and backups are managed to editorial standards, not the generic standards of a shared provider.
No intermediary to be leant on
We do not rely on a host run by third parties, who could be pressured into handing over data or taking down published content.
Custody of the data
Information remains under the control and within the jurisdiction chosen by the publication, rather than scattered across platforms whose rules and access arrangements are unknown.
Write to us at encrypted mailboxes.
Messages between users of the same service are end-to-end encrypted; archives are protected by encryption at rest, with keys held by the user alone. Not even the provider can read the contents of the mailboxes.
The keys remain in the hands of the user alone.
Based outside the main surveillance alliances, with some of the strictest privacy laws anywhere.
By default. Encrypted content cannot be handed over, even to the authorities.
The subject line of an email is not end-to-end encrypted. Never put sensitive information in the subject.
Four steps to protect yourself and your message.
Follow this sequence: each step adds one more barrier between what you send us and anyone who might want to intercept it.
Use encrypted email
For sensitive communications, write to us from an encrypted email service. Two free and reliable options:
Founded in 2014 by scientists from CERN. End-to-end encryption between you and Silere non possum, plus 'zero-access' encryption at rest.
Go to Proton Mail →Encrypts subject lines, attachments, contacts and calendar end to end. Allows anonymous sign-up with no phone number required.
Worth bearing in mind: Germany is part of the 14 Eyes, though encrypted content remains unreadable to third parties regardless.
Go to Tuta →Protect the message with a password
Both Proton Mail and Tuta let you send an encrypted message even to someone who does not use the same service, protecting it with a password of your choosing.
Compose the email and switch on the password-protected message option (Proton: the padlock icon; Tuta: 'confidential').
Set a strong password and, where available, a hint that does not give the password away.
Send. The recipient receives a link and, with the password, can read and reply within an encrypted area that neither provider nor intermediaries can access.
Get the password to us on a separate channel
The reference standard for end-to-end encryption: open source, run by a non-profit foundation, minimal metadata. Recommended by the Freedom of the Press Foundation. Supports usernames, so you never have to reveal your number. Message us: username silere.21.
→
Content is end-to-end encrypted (the same protocol as Signal), but the service is owned by Meta: extensive metadata and US jurisdiction. Less private than Signal.
→
Ordinary chats are not end-to-end encrypted: only 'secret chats' are. To share a password, use a secret chat, or better still choose Signal.
→An address different from the one you used to send the message. A simple, acceptable solution if the other channels are not available.
Set an expiry
Wherever possible, make the message delete itself after a set time: Proton Mail allows an expiry date even for external recipients, and Signal offers disappearing messages. If you use Telegram, switch on a secret chat. Reducing the traces left behind after reading limits the risks should anyone gain access to the device.
Whichever channel you choose, the name of whoever writes to us stays confidential.
We do not reveal, we do not sell, we do not share our sources. It is the first covenant on which the newsroom's work rests.